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ABSTRACT: According to Charles Taylor, practical reasoning helps us overcome cultural conflicts of val-
ue when we are able to show that the passage from one value to another represents an epistemic gain. This 
paper argues that practical reasoning can be effective in pathological cases of cultural convergence but only 
if it is understood as a species of the creative social imagination. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Charles Taylor, the species of practical reasoning he calls reasoning in tran-
sitions or ad hominem argumentation can help us overcome a conflict of value when we 
are able to show that the passage from one value to another represents an epistemic gain. 
Taylor’s position has attracted many social and moral philosophers who have grown in-
creasingly skeptical of the epistemic and motivational promises of what Taylor calls apo-
dictic reasoning. Apodictic reasoning works by drawing exclusive conclusions from un-
contested foundational premises that operate as criteria of arbitration (Taylor 1995: 41). 
Examples of such premises may include the invariant structure of objective value or some 
highly rationalized features of moral willing and human action. The model of apodictic 
reasoning functions in the same way in both of its two main varieties: the teleological 
(which involves criterial forms of means-ends calculation) and the deontological (based 
on a principle of maxim universalization according to which instances of partial success 
denote failures of application). It also reduces the semantic-evaluative and the psycholog-
ical aspects of practical reasoning to a narrow, logical-discursive dimension. As a result, 
much of the richness of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis is lost in the empty formalism 
of modern procedural rationality. 
 Taylor’s own version of practical reasoning on the other hand seeks to overcome 
this impoverished conception of human agency and rationality by focusing on the “moti-
vationally potent, identity-expressive strong values” that provide our choices with ethical 
content (Smith 2002: 45). This also promises to better capture the consensus-building 
evaluative resources, whether cognitive or motivational, that allow us to overcome the 
differences between the often incompatible belief systems of those groups, communities 
or societies that are fragmented along culturally constituted systems of value. But can 
practical reasoning, as Taylor explains it, overcome deeply cultural conflicts of value, 
where the values espoused by the conflicting parties are not only incompatible but perhaps 
also incommensurable? And can it avoid sanctioning ideological forms of culturally repro-
duced evaluative consensus? Furthermore, assuming Taylor’s conception of practical rea-
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soning can do these things, is this because of any perceived gain in moral knowledge? Or is 
it, rather, for reasons that are not fully explicit in Taylor’s own account?  
 Against Taylor’s excessively optimistic view of practical reasoning and in line 
with the latter suggestion, this paper argues, first, that reasoning in transitions or ad hom-
inem argumentation will overcome conflicts of value but only in those societies or social 
groups where there is some preliminary, although perhaps implicit or unconscious, evalu-
ative consensus among the members of the group or society. This consensus is around 
some fundamental value, what Taylor calls a constitutive good. Radically fragmented or 
divided societies may be able to reach such agreement based on the need for survival, but 
as long as this does not become an instance of valuing life, such consensus will always be 
contingent on external conditions that are rarely subject to rational scrutiny. Second, as 
Jürgen Habermas and other critical theorists convincingly show in a different context of 
explanation, Taylor’s version of practical reasoning may be unable to undermine the alle-
giance to repressive values in pathologically developed societies (Habermas 2001: 144-
156). In such societies, external conditions of undistorted, free argumentation must be 
created that would provide reasoners with the necessary argumentative resources to effect 
those transformative transitions that result in an increase in rationality and moral cogni-
tion. Absent such conditions, ad homimem argumentation will always succumb to its 
most destructive inclinations. Lastly, practical reasoning seems hardly capable of deliver-
ing on its promises when its anthropological basis is too far removed from the moral psy-
chology of what in a different context Richard Rorty called the liberal ironist (Rorty 
1989: 73). This label is shorthand for the type of disposition that supports the self-
reflective ethical personality of individuals who possess a highly contextual and deeply 
historical view of the world and their role in it. What is peculiar about these types is their 
commitment to values that promote and enhance human solidarity in a very general and 
socio-historically fluid sense of this word. This both excludes endorsing some other val-
ues as foundational as well as privileges the instrumental values that make possible the 
kind of transformative practical reasoning that Taylor calls reasoning in transitions.  
 These three conditions, the ethical condition of preliminary value convergence in 
a culture, the political condition of communicative socialization through uncoerced ar-
gumentation, and the condition of psychological detachment and reflectivity (achieved 
through skepticism about foundational values) are both mutually dependent as well as 
mutually enhancing. If, however, practical reasoning is unable to break a culturally robust 
monopoly on value; if it is prone to ideological deformations that operate through repres-
sive cultural values; if it is premised on a type of self-conception that is only available to 
individuals in highly rational, modern societies; and given what we know about the exist-
ence of the type of societies that fulfill such conditions, shouldn’t we give up on the hope 
that such form of argumentation is based in reason? In the remainder of the paper I sug-
gest, without going into much detail, that practical reasoning’s potential to interpret, 
transform and internalize values can be enhanced through the appeal to the motivational 
power of utopias, mythologies, symbolic images and other vehicles of semantic innova-
tion. This, I argue, levels the socially and culturally deformed playing fields that make ad 
hominem argumentation effective. Reasoning in transitions will work in cases of patho-
logical socialization, ideological value reproduction, and moral dogmatism, but only if it 
is regarded as a species of the creative social imagination. This further implies that the 
emphasis on the kind of reasoning schemes that tend to be favored in standard textbook 
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treatments (means-ends calculations, say, or cases of material incompatibility, as demon-
strated by failures in maxim universalization; for illustration of these, see Walton’s im-
portant 1990 book) must be weakened to make room for the motivational and cognition-
enhancing capacity of those rhetorical devices that do the work of the imagination and 
create the conditions under which such schemes could be effective. After presenting some 
elements of Taylor’s specific conception of practical reasoning, the paper will address in 
more detail the objections presented earlier while formulating a more developed response 
to these based on a selective reconstruction of some of the ideas of Cornelius Castoriadis 
(1987) and Paul Ricoeur (1986, 1991). 
2. PRACTICAL REASONING AS STRONG EVALUATION  
Taylor’s account of practical reasoning is deeply informed by his suspicion towards what 
Max Horkheimer had called the subjectivization of reason decades earlier (Horkheimer 
1974: 3-57). This was the exclusive focus on procedural conceptions of rationality that 
originate in the Enlightenment project of detaching reason from the objective sources of 
normative authority of the cultural tradition (Taylor 1995: 40-41). Taylor’s own alterna-
tive, as will hopefully emerge from this reconstruction, is to maintain a moment of self-
reflective autonomy within the wider context of our evaluations while at the same time 
abandoning the proceduralist ideal in practical reasoning and theoretical explanation that 
in his view is responsible for hollowing out both reason and the practice of evaluation 
itself. In Taylor’s view, the proceduralist vein of the modern conceptions of knowledge 
and action is one of the final stages in the gradual process of the naturalization of reason 
and the rationalization of human nature (Taylor 1995: 38). This on the one hand promised 
and on the other promoted an ideal of human autonomy in which the subject, whether 
practical or theoretical, is perceived as the only authoritative source of binding rules for 
cognition and action. However, despite some obvious advantages, the model of reasoning 
developed from this ideal suffers from severe normative indeterminacy. For making the 
subject the source of conceptual content typically results in a form of agent relativity that 
takes one’s contingency as the only valid source of normative insight and legitimacy 
(which ultimately undermines the liberating claims of subjective rationality and hence 
ends up subordinating the ideal of autonomy to voluntarism and its political avatar, deci-
sionism). On the other hand, granting conceptual contents their normative independence 
results in the uncritical endorsement of unexamined forces of socio-historical contingen-
cy. Some such forces are the forms of ethical life that undermine the meaningful exercise 
of autonomy by deriving normative authority from pathological forms of social interac-
tion. The only alternative to these is the return to a situated type of practical reason that 
avoids drawing on metaphysical premises while providing a satisfactory account of a 
context-dependent, yet not entirely contingent, source of normativity. Taylor believes that 
his conception of strong evaluation offers this account, for the “vocabularies we need to 
explain human thought, action, feeling, or to explicate, analyze, justify ourselves or each 
other, or to deliberate on what to do, all inescapably rely on strong evaluation” (Taylor 
1995: 39). His is a conception that explains the evaluation of all initial orientations to-
ward various goods, our first level desires of objects or other such immediate, un-
reflected ends—what Taylor calls weak or quantitative evaluation—on a higher level, 
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where we are preoccupied not with the immediate satisfaction of desires but, rather, with 
the quality of our motivation (Taylor 1985: 17).  
 Now, clearly, all evaluation requires some standards, however implicit they may 
be, and the necessary appeal to these is what Taylor explains with the help of the notion 
of import. Imports represent ascriptions of meaning in determinate situations of desiring 
that demand choice, such as experiencing shame in relation to something that elicits it 
(Taylor 1985: 48). These imports are internalizations of goods, that is, standards by virtue 
of which we determine what “matters”, what is of value for us in strong evaluation (Tay-
lor 1989: 33). And, given that the content of imports is always drawn from within a cul-
tural community’s horizon of meaning, it follows that strong evaluation appeals to a 
source of value that is both accessed as well as constituted by the individual in her evalu-
ations (Taylor 1989: 26-27, 91-92). Strong evaluation, therefore, represents a moment of 
self-transcendence within a given context of moral meaning, a form of situated and at the 
same time empirically achieved evaluative autonomy. 
 As is well known, Taylor introduces several categories of goods. First, there are 
what he calls life-goods, and, within this category, but ranking higher, the hypergoods, 
“goods which not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the 
standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor 1989: 63). 
Then, at the top of the scale, come the constitutive goods, what Taylor also calls moral 
sources, that is, grounds that validate as well as enhance the motivational power of all the 
other life goods (Taylor 1989: 93, 1991: 243). If we take into account these distinctions 
between categories of goods, it becomes clear that for Taylor practical reasoning (now 
conceived of as strong evaluation) means finding one’s way on the evaluative map by 
learning which goods apply and when, in which order, whether some have priority and in 
which circumstances, or whether their content changes in the context of application. 
Strong evaluation therefore fulfills several functions. First, it shows that it can shape 
practical agency by privileging the strong evaluator, the self-reflective subject of practical 
maxims and rules, at the expense of the weak “weigher of alternatives.” In contrast, tradi-
tional apodictic reasoning assumes a concept of agency that it cannot explain let alone 
shape. The agent in this tradition is the self-transparent and self-controlled, detached sub-
ject who possesses an unexplainable capacity for autonomous action that is always di-
rected by the right reasons and appropriately responds to these with the right type of ac-
tion. Much of our experience with such agents and the type of actions they engage in 
shows us that this is almost never the case.  
 Second, this process of strong evaluation is one of both moral learning as well as 
cognitive self-clarification. The agent learns much about what motivates her to action in 
the process of examining the moral worth of her first-level desires in relation to the high-
er standards, or the goods. At the same time, this forces her to focus on the numerous var-
iables over which the goods range and determine whether they are compatible with one 
another or with the goods themselves. The activity is also one that brings into focus the 
implicit hierarchy of goods that need to be harmonized when desires clash or when cer-
tain types of goods are revealed as inoperative standards of evaluation. As a result, the 
meaning of the goods is further determined in the course of interpretations that are trig-
gered by the effort to apply standards of evaluation to conflicting desires. All this would 
be impossible on the apodictic model of practical reasoning which applies criteria within 
a binary logic of exclusion between true and false, right and wrong, etc. Generating con-
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tents and forming the will is not part of what this type of reasoning typically does or sets 
out to do. And this shows that reasoning in transitions is more of an art of application, as 
in Aristotle, than a reliable technique for drawing materially correct inferences.  
 Only if practical reasoning is exercised in a space that has been previously natu-
ralized (or formalized, or rationalized), which is to say, sanitized, or cleared of any refer-
ence to moral contents that become available through strong evaluation, could we find 
comfort in the kind of proceduralist form of evaluation that draws on nothing but itself. 
The alternative would not be to 
[…] disprove some radically opposed first premise (say killing people is no problem), but ra-
ther to show how the policy is unconscionable on premises which both sides accept, and can-
not but accept. In this case, its job is to show up the special pleas. … On this mod-
el…practical argument starts off on the basis that my opponent shares at least some of the 
fundamental dispositions toward good and right which guide me. The error comes from con-
fusion, lack of clarity, or an unwillingness to face some of what he can’t lucidly repudiate; 
and reasoning aims to show up this error. Changing someone’s moral view by reasoning is 
always at the same time increasing his self-clarity and self-understanding. (Taylor 1995: 36) 
3. REASONING IN TRANSITIONS 
Taylor explains reasoning in transitions in two different contexts: the context of theoreti-
cal or scientific explanation and the context of moral argumentation. In each context he 
introduces two types of transitions, one more radical than the other, which gradually 
move us away from the model of apodictic reasoning. The first type of transition consists 
of providing an interpretation of the world (of nature or of human affairs) that is better at 
explaining some physical anomalies or moral conflicts than the model it tries to super-
sede. The transition is regarded as providing some cognitive gain.  
 Taylor’s example of such a gain centers on the transition from the Aristotelian 
model of explanation of violent motion to the Galilean, which takes into account such 
physical facts as the gravitational pull of the earth and the force of inertia (Taylor 1995: 
43-47). Such a transition, Taylor argues, cannot be settled on the apodictic, criterial mod-
el of reasoning that claims to settle disputes based on incontestable epistemic principles, 
for in this model there can be no mediating epistemic principle that could do justice to 
both theories, and clearly not on their own terms. One theory looks at final causes and at 
our place in the moral universe, the other deals with our capacity for model manipulation 
and efficient control based on reliable prediction. What we do have, however, is the reali-
zation that we can make sense of the transition from the Aristotelian to the Galilean mod-
el but not the other way around. This is because the latter can account for both models on 
its own terms, whereas the former cannot. Thus, even when the two models are ultimately 
based in different or perhaps incompatible world-views or systems of value (one gov-
erned by the need to figure out one’s moral position in the universe, the other by a natu-
ralistic ideal of explanation that has already decided what that position is or that it need 
not concern itself with such questions) one can move from one to the other without hav-
ing to decide the transition by appeal to criteria that both models could accept. The transi-
tion is a gradual abandonment of one position for another based on the realization that the 
latter is comparatively “better” on the ground of some “extra-epistemic considerations” 
(Taylor 1995: 46). The new theory or point of view is “better” not because of some spe-
cial epistemic insight gained through consistent application of criteria but because, as 
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Richard Rorty has put it in a similar context of explanation, “they come to seem as better” 
(Rorty 1982: xxxvii). The judgment involved is comparative, not apodictic. We realize 
what the superseded position was aiming for, but now we are pursuing something differ-
ent, which is why we have no choice but to jettison the previous one as comparatively 
useless. And, turning now to moral explanations, a similar type of account could justify 
the move from, say, an honor-based system of economic activity to a class-based one, and 
then the move from the ethics that underlies the latter to a capacity based ethics that em-
phasizes the worth of qualities other than lineage or social position. In these cases we are 
dealing with a transition that can be described as a gain in moral understanding but only 
from the standpoint provided by the individualistic ethos that can satisfy the production 
requirements of the capitalist socio-economic system. From the perspective of the ancient 
code of honor, the protestant ethic is incomprehensible.  
 The second type of transition Taylor discusses illustrates not epistemic gain but, 
rather, error-reduction in cases of moral confusion about what values one truly endorses, 
or about which ones should take precedence in situations of conflict between two sets of 
values or their instantiation. Taylor’s examples deal with situations when we correct a 
previous interpretation of our moral situation in relation to our perception of the good. 
The interpretation in all such cases is a transition that is mediated by a change in our in-
terpretation of that good, or of what the good requires of us. Just like in the previous type 
of transition, the change that comes to be seen as the correction of an error looks more 
like a clarification of one’s position than a decisive appeal to foundations. In cases of 
moral clarification reasoning in transitions means ”making appeal to our implicit under-
standing of our forms of life” (Taylor 1995: 49), that is, clarifying how we stand in rela-
tion to values, which values we truly endorse, how we respond to conflicts of value, etc. 
In other words, figuring out our position on a given moral map and, in the process, im-
proving on its contents. 
 Now, when Taylor talks about transitions, he clearly indicates that the justifica-
tion for moving from one position to another is provided by the transition itself, which 
often sounds like a concession to an ethnocentric and historicist mode of understanding. 
However, for a transition to also qualify as ad hominem argumentation, it would have to 
provide the grounds for motivating a reasoner to accept the evaluative result of the transi-
tion. This, however, cannot be the work of the transition itself, and neither can it be the 
result of embracing the newly clarified or emerging value or value horizon. If the transi-
tion is also a form of strong evaluation, and if the evaluation consists in weighing desires 
based on interpretations of goods and internalizing such interpreted goods, it will follow 
that the motivating factor must be the value that moves one to engage in the transition. 
This value could be implicit in one’s other valuations, and the agent clarifies it or makes 
it explicit in a process of evaluation that is initiated from the standpoint provided by a 
different value. The value could also be a hypergood we initially mistook for an ordinary 
good and as a result relegated to a subordinated position. But I do not see it as being lo-
cated in or generated by the transition itself. Which further suggests that the motivational 
dimension that makes reasoning in transitions an ad hominem form of argumentation is 
based in some higher-level consensus, however implicit, on what agents would accept as 
a common constitutive good. And so the transition must be one between interpretations of 
what best represents and satisfies our interests, that is, a higher-level good. (Here one is 
tempted to argue that Taylor’s model of practical reasoning does not look that much dif-
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ferent from the one he criticizes; perhaps the emphasis should not be on the appeal to cri-
teria but, rather, to the bi-univocal relationship between principle and application that can 
account for the gradual shift of meaning that occurs in transitions.) 
 Earlier I argued that one could not expect any such transitions to take place un-
less three conditions are satisfied. First is the condition of minimal ethical convergence 
toward some constitutive good that could motivate the transition from one interpretation 
to another even in cases where the transition is as radical as in the move from Aristotelian 
to Galilean physics. In this example, one can arguably show that the gain in understand-
ing was motivated not by a fresh look at the “facts” but, rather, by a decision to consider 
facts as the preferred framework for an interpretation of our place in the world of value, 
one that promised to bring us closer to value, rather than closer to the facts. The dispute 
between Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine could be described then as a conflict over the 
proper normative source of epistemic authority—facts versus the tradition—rather than a 
dispute over the meaning of scientific truth. But how could one persuade someone to 
abandon one interpretation for another if the gap between the positions is so wide that no 
value convergence seems possible? In all fairness, Taylor (1995: 50, 58-59) himself admits 
that this may pose a formidable obstacle. Absent such convergence, there is very little that 
could motivate the transition and thus appear as a gain, and the alternative seems to be a 
form of ethical Alexandrinism, a cacophony of parochial interests that vie for supremacy.  
 The second condition deals with the need for having a relatively open space for 
practical argumentation, free from political or other forms of interference such as distor-
tions in moral perception caused by an ideological production of value convergence. This 
affects all models of practical reasoning, but more so reasoning in transitions, which must 
rely on the superior motivational power of alternative interpretations of the good to pre-
sent the move from one position to another as error reducing or as an epistemic gain. 
Values may distort reasoning by often making it impossible for us to identify which 
needs must be selected for generalization as legitimate interests, that is, as appropriate 
candidates for providing content to practical norms (Rehg 2002: 145). Another version of 
such distortion is when the choice of interests is steered by an evaluative context that has 
evolved over time under all kinds of critically unexamined socio-economic and cultural 
pressures. In both situations, practical reasoning will perform a purely instrumental func-
tion aimed at improving the efficiency of decision mechanisms based on a consensus that 
barely responds to the needs of those involved. Needless to say, when such deformations 
happen, the transition to an epistemically superior moral position is fatally hindered by 
the inability to appeal to the kind of value that properly satisfies needs by responding to 
legitimate interests. One cannot find motivational resources in an alternative interpreta-
tion of the good if there is no room to engage in such interpretation due to pathological 
conditions of socio-political development. 
 Finally, reasoning in transitions seems to depend on a particular type of anti-
dogmatic moral personality or ethical temperament that is usually the product of a liberal 
culture that both encourages as well as is shaped by transitions and effective ad hominem 
argumentation. Transitioning is unlikely if the target of the ad hominem argument is too 
dogmatically tied to a particular interpretation of value to respond to what the new inter-
pretation demands. All this seems to indicate that in order for reasoning in transitions to 
succeed it must be backed up by a rhetorical component that could facilitate the transition 
at the motivational level. This could explain the leap in motivational space from one in-
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terpretation of value to another (or from one value to another) as a shift in the social im-
agination that compels us to accept a new position in moral space and thereby to engage 
in the transition that will also justify it. In the following I briefly discuss this possibility 
by looking at two accounts of the social imagination and of the resources it mobilizes in 
pursuit of interest-expressive value convergence or to encourage normative disruptions 
when the values repress needs. 
4. THE CREATIVE SOCIAL IMAGINATION 
The philosophical tradition speaks of different kinds of imagination. However, only one 
of these kinds is useful in the present context, and this is the productive or creative imag-
ination that is operative in analogical thinking and symbolic action. Kant made it possible 
for us to understand the working of the imagination in these terms in his account of moral 
symbolism through aesthetic ideas and in his discussion of the phenomenon of sublimity 
as the imaginative leap from the realm of inadequate aesthetic presentation into the do-
main of moral ideas. This way of understanding the imagination has been taken up and 
applied in a more useful way (for the present discussion) to the sphere of the social and of 
the ethical by Cornelius Castoriadis and Paul Ricoeur. The former is important because 
he, like Clifford Geertz before him, provides us with an understanding of the social 
world, the world of representation and action and of social communication and institu-
tions, as one that is symbolically structured in a way that always leaves room for a sur-
plus of signification that cannot be reduced to what is signified (Castoriadis 1987: 117, 
127). The social imagination operates through symbols, which allows it to mobilize this 
surplus in ways that redefine the horizon of meaning. This in turn determines the identity 
of a society, the symbolic space within which this society understands itself. The follow-
ing quotation captures this very nicely: 
Who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What 
do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking? Society must define its ‘identity,’ its ar-
ticulation, the world, its relations to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its 
desires. Without the ‘answer’ to these ‘questions,’ without these ‘definitions,’ there can be no 
human world, no society, no culture…. The role of imaginary significations is to provide an 
answer to these questions, an answer that, obviously, neither ‘reality’ nor ‘rationality’ can 
provide… . (Castoriadis 1987: 146-147) 
Needless to say, this is also precisely what is required in reasoning in transitions: the capacity 
to expand one’s self-understanding in the world of symbolically instituted significance by 
means of the imaginary use of the surplus of signification (Castoriadis 1987: 370 f.).  
 Ricoeur, on the other hand, who shares many of Castoriadis’ views on symbolic 
action and the imaginary institution of society, gives us a very detailed account of how 
the creative social imagination uses the surplus of signification. He claims it uses this 
surplus in situations of ideological value-convergence or radical non-convergence, or in 
cases where the person with whom one argues is too dogmatically tied to a particular val-
ue-interpretation, too stuck in a self-conception to be moved in a way that may signal a 
transition from one good to another or from one interpretation of the good to one that is 
better. For Ricoeur, the essential distinction in practical reasoning is between inference 
and analogical thinking. Thinking through analogies is a perfect example of semantic in-
novation of the type that we see in the use of metaphors or in other forms of symbolic 
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thinking, and the symbolic action that institutes society is just an extension of symbolic 
thinking. Given this notion of practical reasoning, the role of the imagination must be to 
generate such innovation and thereby motivate transitions that will also re-describe society 
and symbolically restructure its evaluative contents in the process (Ricoeur 1991: 168-175).  
 The imagination is directly involved in the very process of motivation that creates 
or destroys the links between selves and values or interpretations of values. Two, mutually 
antagonistic but dialectically related modes of the imagination (or imaginative practices, as 
Ricoeur also calls them) operate in this way: ideology and utopia (Ricoeur 1986: 250-259). 
The former is a practice that in its non-pathological mode leads to social integration by 
symbolically constituting the most elementary social bonds. Ideology exerts this power by 
finding analogies that reinforce what is common in one’s orientation to value and rejecting 
interpretations that create divisions with no basis in value. When one seeks to overcome 
apparent differences in value orientation, we can effect the transition from one position to 
another only because we can emphasize what we have in common. This is the job of ideo-
logical imaginary practices. Discourses of solidarity typically have this form. 
 Utopia on the other hand has a subversive function. It is eccentric, erratic, and 
wandering. Semantic innovation is more pronounced in the utopian mode of the imagina-
tion, as is the case in all other forms of analogical thinking. The disruptions caused by the 
utopian imagination “open the field of the possible beyond that of the actual, a field for 
alternative ways of living” (Ricoeur 1991: 320). As an aide to practical reasoning, the 
utopian mode of the imagination helps break the hold of those repressive values that have 
assumed an ideological function by covering up needs that can only be satisfied by en-
gaging in a transition. In this sense, the utopian imagination puts us in a position to see 
that a transition is error reducing or may result in a gain. If ideology achieves integration 
through solidarity around a shared but implicit value, utopias often point out that one has 
lost sight of a value, or that one has subordinated a value to another, less-important one in 
a way that distorts our actual value-orientations. Both modes help practical reasoning ef-
fect its transitions; to some extent, they are practical reasoning because no ad hominem 
would work without their help. 
5. CONCLUSION 
I have argued in the preceding pages that Taylor’s conception of practical reasoning 
works better than the apodictic model in modern, value pluralist societies. I have also 
suggested that this conception must include an account of the necessary conditions of free 
socialization and undistorted reproduction of cultural value without which practical rea-
soning would rarely engage in any real or meaningful transitions. Yet the fact that such 
transitions materialize even in the absence of such conditions seems to indicate that this 
model of practical reasoning generates some of its moral content through the semantic 
innovation that is performed by the social imagination.  
  
RADU NECULAU 
10 
REFERENCES 
Castoriadis, C. (1987). The Imaginary Institution of Society (tr. K. Blamey), Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, J. (2001). Reflections on communicative pathology. On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction  
(tr. B. Fultner, pp. 129-70). Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.  
Horkheimer, M. (1974). Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum. 
Rehg, W. (2002). Discourse and the moral point of view: Deriving a dialogical principle of universalization. 
In: Rasmussen, D.M., and Swindal, J. (eds). Jürgen Habermas, Vol. III (pp. 137-57). London: Sage. 
Ricoeur, P. (1986). Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1991) From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics, Vol. II (tr. K. Blamey, J. B. Thomson). 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, N. N. (2002). Taylor and the hermeneutic tradition. In: Abbey, R. (ed.). Charles Taylor (pp. 29-51). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1985). Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers I. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1991). Comments and replies. Inquiry 34, 237-254. 
Taylor, C. (1995). Explanation and practical reasoning. Philosophical Arguments (pp. 34-60). Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press.  
Walton, D.N. (1990). Practical Reasoning. Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the 
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-3. 
Commentary on ‘PRACTICAL REASONING  
AS CREATIVE SOCIAL IMAGINATION’ by Radu Neculau 
JAMES BRADLEY 
Department of Philosophy 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
St. John’s, Newfoundland, A1C 5S7 
Canada 
jbradley@mun.ca 
In Dr. Neculau’s fine and subtle paper, he agrees with Charles Taylor (1995: 34-60) that 
the model of apodictic reasoning is inadequate to the nature of ethical judgement, and in 
particular to ethical conflict resolution. Dr. Neculau holds that Taylor’s model of practi-
cal reasoning, understood as the kind of reasoning that effects transitions from one kind 
of ethical belief or behavior to another, is the correct model for ethical judgement and 
conflict resolution. However, Dr. Neculau claims that there is a key feature missing in 
Taylor’s model of practical reasoning: namely, the “semantic innovations” offered by the 
products of creative imagination operative in analogical thinking and symbolic action, 
which possess a powerful rhetorical component that can effect ethical transition, even in 
“pathologically developed” societies. Shelley’s well-known dictum that poets are “the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world” is relevant here, as are Robert Browning’s 
lines: “But art…/…art may tell a truth obliquely,/ Do the deed shall breed the thought”. 
Iris Murdoch’s Sovereignty of Good (1970) also powerfully supports Dr. Neculau’s claim. 
 Most of us, I think, are likely to agree that Dr. Neculau is making an important 
point. How much it affects Taylor’s theory of practical reasoning, I leave to discussion. 
What I am not at all sure about is Dr. Neculau’s account of the nature of “strong evalua-
tion”, the nature of our commitment to constitutive goods, those accounts of ultimate 
moral sources “that validate as well as enhance the motivational power of all other life 
goods”. Constitutive goods, Dr. Neculau says, are “social constructs”, the product of so-
cio-historical development, but their validity extends beyond their situated origin and 
“their ontological status is not reducible to any socio-historical contingencies” (my em-
phasis). It is Dr. Neculau’s acknowledgment of the role that constitutive goods play in 
ethical conflict that leads to his “return to a situated type of practical reasoning that 
avoids drawing on metaphysical premises while providing a satisfactory account of a 
context-dependent, yet not entirely contingent, source of normativity” (my emphases).
 If Dr. Neculau is right about the role of the creative imagination, then in the light 
of his account of the ontological status of constitutive goods, I think creative imagination 
involves much more than what he naturalistically calls “semantic innovation”. Rather, 
creative imagination is the engine of ontological innovation. There is perhaps a tension 
here between a strong Taylorian ontological emphasis one side, and some sort of inter-
subjectivist naturalism on the other side—a tension that needs addressing.  
 To press the point, Dr. Neculau talks of constitutive goods naturalistically, in 
terms of “desires”, “needs” and “interests”, whereas, as I shall show, a characteristic of 
constitutive goods is that they transcend desires, needs and interests in any ordinary sense 
of those terms. 
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 More importantly, Dr. Neculau argues against Taylor’s view that “the justifica-
tion for moving from one [ethical] position to another is provided by the transition itself”. 
For Dr. Neculau, such a view “sounds like a concession to an ethnocentric and historicist 
mode of understanding”.  
 By contrast, Dr. Neculau holds that for an ethical “transition to… qualify as ad 
hominem argumentation, it would also have to provide the grounds for motivating a rea-
soner to accept the evaluative result of the transition. This, however, cannot be the work 
of the transition itself… If the transition is also a form of strong evaluation… it will fol-
low that the motivating factor must be the value that moves one to engage in the transi-
tion… I do not see [the value] as being located in or generated by the transition itself”. 
 This, I suspect, is a very questionable claim. Take an example that Taylor refers 
to (1995: 57): the non-belligerent spread of early Christianity in the Mediterranean world. 
The new and transformative constitutive good or ethico-ontological principle that grew 
and developed there, amid a complex of material-historical conditions, is the principle 
and ideal of agape or unconditional love for others, whatever their nature, good or evil, 
and beyond any need, desire or interest on the part of the love-giver. One consequence of 
this principle—not, as is often thought, its basis—is of course the view that persons are 
absolute ends in themselves, a view which has vexed us to nightmare in the West, and 
now indeed haunts the whole world 
 The key question is: how did the transition to the fundamental principle of agape 
happen? Movements such as Christianity, as well as Buddhism, represent insights into the 
potentialities of human nature and human relations which at one time were insights into 
hitherto undreamt of ways of acting. They have indeed subsequently become, as the dis-
course theorist would say, the subject of considerable agreement, in virtue of immensely 
complex historical developments. These movements define and constitute for many (con-
sciously or not) that object we call ‘human nature and relations’. And how did they do 
that? Not indeed primarily by discursive agreement or consensus at all, but primarily by 
action, by exemplary action, and thus by edification. In these movements, it is exemplary 
action that uncovers and actualizes the potentialities of the object. There was not a body 
of rules that were agreed, and then acted, upon. The rules could only be articulated in 
action, and only by action did they come to be understood, even by their proponents. It is 
by action above all that an ethical object is constituted; the reasons then follow. No doubt 
from the start it was supposed by the initiating agents that such actions could be justified; 
but even that was difficult for them, not least because it was contrary to prevailing atti-
tudes—folly to the Greeks! The crucial thing is that the actions uncovered new features 
of the object, and it is the newly perceived and newly apprehended object which is the 
basis of the subsequent rules and justifications. 
 Here, in other words, are examples of world-historical transitions where the val-
uation is in fact located wholly in the transition and is wholly generated in the transition 
itself. Reasoning in transition cannot ignore edification, the primacy of action over 
thought, and even over symbolic interchange. It is not only artists who “Do the deed shall 
breed the thought”. There is a real if nowadays often overlooked place in practical rea-
soning for the hero, the saint and the guru. 
 Allow me to go one step further, and ask this: does not Dr. Neculau’s account of 
practical reasoning, far from naturalistically avoiding “metaphysical premises”, in fact 
have a metaphysical basis itself, a basis which alone explains why practical reasoning 
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gives rise to values that are at once social constructs with ontological status? This meta-
physical basis, I suggest, resides in what has been called the ontological theory of truth 
(Campbell 1992: 56ff.): namely the theory that truth is a state or relation of the real. Here, 
whether articulated in a platonic, scholastic, idealist or Peircean-pragmatist framework, 
the real is understood to be an activity of disclosure or manifestation. 
 The crucial point is that, since the rise of Christianity, this activity of disclosure 
or manifestation is held to occur in history and to be intrinsically a matter of the move-
ment of history. In contrast to Greek views of truth, truth is not a timeless state of affairs. 
It must occur, and it must be unfolded and realized again and again in new situations that 
shed fresh light on it. It is as such intrinsically connected to actions in time. As a result, 
truth is not a reality that lies behind appearances, but is something that emerges in history 
and is nothing other than its realization in the contingent materiality of the movement of 
history, even though the real, with all its indeterminate potentialities, is more than any of 
its specific historical manifestations. History is thus not reducible to mere happenstance: 
the unity of the real and the historical is a relation of realization, a matter of the actualiza-
tion of potentialities. We are here far beyond any form of relativizing historicism: reality 
itself is understood as a continuum of indeterminate potentialities which come to deter-
mination in the actions and thoughts of historical agents. Reality itself is constructive in 
nature, and this is the real reason why Dr. Neculau’s creative imagination is so important.  
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